Till taxes do us part: Tax penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision by Barigozzi, Francesca et al.
  
 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article:   
Barigozzi, Francesca, Helmuth Cremer, and Kerstin Roeder. "Till taxes do us part: Tax 
penalties or bonuses and the marriage decision." European Economic Review 118 
(2019): 37-50. 
The final published version is available online at: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.001 
 
 
 
©2019. This manuscript version is made available under the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs (CC BY-NC-ND) 4.0 International License 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(This item was downloaded from IRIS Università di Bologna (https://cris.unibo.it/) 
When citing, please refer to the published version. 
Till taxes do us part: tax penalties or bonuses and the
marriage decision1
Francesca Barigozzi2 Helmuth Cremer3 Kerstin Roeder4
October 2017, revised April 2019
1We thank the reviewers and the editors for their constructive and insightful comments.
2University of Bologna, Italy, Email: francesca.barigozzi@unibo.it.
3Toulouse School of Economics, France, Email: helmuth.cremer@tse-fr.eu.
4University of Augsburg, Germany, Email: kerstin.roeder@wiwi.uni-augsburg.de.
Abstract
The tax regimes applied to couples in many countries including the US, France, and
Germany imply either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. We study how they affect
the decision to get married by considering two potential spouses who play a marriage
proposal game. At the end of the game they may get married, live together without
formal marriage, or split up. Proposing (or getting married) implies a cost that can
indicate strong love. The striking property we obtain is that a marriage bonus may
actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently
large, signaling is no longer informative, and a pooling equilibrium in which no couples
get married remains. Similarly, a marriage penalty may increase marriages. The penalty
may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission,
which was otherwise not possible.
JEL classification: J12, D82, H31
Keywords: marriage penalty, marriage bonus, proposal game, signaling
My most brilliant achievement was my ability to be able to persuade my wife to marry
me.
Winston Churchill
1 Introduction
The tax regimes applied to couples typically imply either a marriage penalty or a mar-
riage bonus. A marriage penalty involves higher taxes for married couples than for two
otherwise identical single individuals; a bonus implies lower taxes for married couples.
A marriage penalty applies, for instance, in the US; see Alm et al. (1999). In France or
Germany, on the other hand, there is a marriage bonus due to income splitting.1 While
there appears to be a trend towards more individualized tax systems, very few systems
are effectively completely neutral with respect to the marital status; see OECD (2005;
2017). Even when the tax unit is nominally referred to as “individual based”, there is
in most instances some correction reflecting the marital status. Consequently, most tax
systems potentially affect a couple’s decision to get married in the first place.2
In this paper we study the impact of a marriage bonus or penalty on the decision
to get married. We consider a model where two potential spouses play a marriage
proposal game at the end of which they may get married, live together without formal
marriage, or split up. This is a signaling game where proposing, or more precisely
getting married, involves the risk of a costly divorce, but can indicate a high quality
match. Consequently, the possibility to send a costly signal may permit “efficient”
(that is mutually beneficial) matches to be concluded which otherwise would not be
achieved because of asymmetries of information. The striking property we obtain is
that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the probability that a couple gets married.
1In France and Germany each spouse’s taxable income is defined as half of total family income. The
couple’s total tax liability is then twice the tax calculated for each spouse. Because of the concavity of
the tax function this reduces the couples’ tax liability unless both spouses have identical incomes or, at
least, are in the same tax bracket.
2For the interpretation and discussion we concentrate on income taxation, but other taxes, like
inheritance taxes are typically also affected by the marital status. The same is true for some welfare
benefits which can be considered as negative taxes.
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If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signal becomes uninformative: pooling equilibria
emerge in which either inefficient matches also occur or no matches at all are concluded.
Similarly, a marriage penalty may induce efficient marriages. Specifically, the penalty
may lead to a separating equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission,
which absent of a costly signal would not occur.
Our focus on the signaling value of a marriage proposal is in line with evidence from
studies of the family. For instance, Seltzer (2000, page 1252) argues that, in the U.S.,
“informal unions dissolve more quickly than do formal marriages because of differences
in the quality of the match between partners who marry and those who do not.” Using
Swedish data, Perelli-Harris and Andersson (2017) find that the union stability advan-
tage of married couples may, to a large extent, be driven by the selectivity of couples
who choose to marry. Hiekel and Keizer (2010), examining Dutch adults’ perceptions
about cohabitation and marriage, report that marriage is not only considered a signal
of serious allegiance towards one’s partner, but is also a public statement in front of
family and friends. More recently, Lundberg et al. (2016) argue that marriage works
as a commitment device because it is more costly to exit than cohabitation. Our model
shows that this cost can signal the quality of a match and that the cost differential
explains why marriage is a more effective signaling device than cohabitation.
From a positive perspective, our paper provides an analysis of how real world tax
systems may affect the decision to get married and it offers a possible explanation to
the relevant empirical results. Empirical papers suggest that a bonus or a penalty have
little impact on the marriage decision. This is rather surprising since they can be rather
sizeable; see Leturcq (2012) for an overview of this literature.3 This result can reflect
two rather different realities at the micro level. On the one hand, it may arise because
individual marriage decisions are not significantly affected by taxes. This is puzzling,
though, precisely because the penalties or bonuses can be quite large (and in any given
country they all go in the same direction). However, we can also have an insignificant
3Leturcq (2012) concentrates on civil unions rather than on marriage. However, in the introduction
she extensively discusses the literature which has looked at the impact of the tax system on marriage,
mainly in the US, but also in France.
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aggregate impact when individuals effects are significant but go in different directions.
Our model offers a possible foundation for the latter explanation. We indeed show that
depending on the couple’s parameters a given penalty or bonus can both foster or deter
marriages. The aggregate impact thus sums up positive and negative effects which
may well more or less cancel out. This of course depends on the distribution of the
parameters in the population, but either way it is clear that the conflicting individual
effect will tend to mitigate the aggregate impact; see Section 5 for further discussion.
In addition, our analysis is meant to provide guidance to future research on the op-
timal taxation of couples. The existing theoretical literature on couple taxation mostly
ignores how taxation affects the decision to get married.4 As pointed out by Kaplow
(2008, page 342) “... a scheme that is ideal on distributive grounds is likely to influ-
ence marriage decisions.” In other words, it is unlikely that a purely individualistic tax
(which would be neutral with regard to the marriage decision) is optimal.5 But it is not
clear whether this optimal joint taxation fosters or discourages marriages. To the best
of our knowledge, there is no general result in tax theory concerning the desirability
of a marriage bonus or penalty, even when couples are exogenously given. Considering
endogenous marriages adds an extra layer of complexity. Assuming, like Kaplow sug-
gests, that the marriage decision would be otherwise privately optimal, the effect a tax
system has on this decision should be accounted for when designing the optimal policy.
Our paper is not in contradiction to his otherwise insightful view, but it shows that
the potential distortions are more complex than those he envisions; see the Conclusion
for further discussion.
Signaling in the marriage market has been analyzed as a way to overcome asymmet-
ric information and allow profitable matching. However, earlier studies emphasize the
role of status goods and conspicuous consumption as signals of income, which represents
4See, for instance, Boskin and Sheshinski, (1983); Apps and Rees (1999); Cremer et al. (2012), or,
more recently, Cremer et al. (2016). Chade and Ventura (2002) do study tax design with endogenous
marriages and search frictions, but they focus on tax reform rather than on optimal taxation.
5For a given family structure, the optimal tax schedule is determined by a number of possibly
conflicting effects. These include issues of redistribution between and within couples, labor supply
elasticities, efficiency of household production, etc.; see Apps and Rees (2009, Ch 6); or Kaplow (2008,
Ch 12) for detailed overviews.
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a crucial but unobservable characteristic evaluated by potential partners (see De Fraja
2009, Bronsert et al. 2016, and references within). Our signaling model has a different
focus. First, potential partners signal their feelings rather than some pecuniary charac-
teristics. Second, our model is related to the “motivation crowding theory” according
to which monetary rewards may undermine intrinsic motivation and reduce individu-
als’ prosocial activities (Titmuss 1970). Different mechanisms have been proposed to
explain the unintended consequences of monetary incentives. Like Be´nabou and Tirole
(2006), we examine how pecuniary incentives might interact with individuals’ intrinsic
motivation by diluting the signaling value of (virtuous) behavior.6 A nice feature of our
very simple signaling model is that, without information transmission, no matching is
possible; thus welfare gains and losses from monetary incentives are extremely natural
and simple to measure.
2 The Model
2.1 The marriage proposal game
Sam (S = Sender) and Robin (R = Receiver) are two partners who interact strategi-
cally.7 They may or may not be already cohabiting. Let θS ∈ {θL, θH} with θH > θL > 0
denote the probability that the match between the two partners is long lasting. This
probability represents Sam’s unobservable feelings for Robin. Some information on the
quality of the match may already have been disclosed, but some uncertainty remains.8
6We depart from Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) in two important ways. First, the mechanism analyzed
by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006) focuses on the interaction between an individual’s “image concern”
and their “altruism” which jointly motivate prosocial activities. Uncertainty on both characteristics is
essential to generating net crowding out. Our mechanism does not require such a degree of complexity
and we can focus on a single parameter of private information. Second, in Be´nabou and Tirole (2006),
individuals’ utilities are an increasing function of their reputation of being altruist, which in turn is
generated by their prosocial activities. The authors are not interested in the strategic interaction
between the sender of the signal (the individual) and the receiver (all the other individuals). We instead
focus on the interaction between the sender and the receiver and crowding in/out is directly measured
by the amount of efficient matches that become possible/impossible.
7As illustrated by the choice of the player’s name our game is meant to represent the proposal game
of any pair of potential partners irrespective of their gender. This gender neutrality is implicit in all our
arguments even though we often refer to Sam, the sender, as “he” and Robin, the receiver, as “she”.
This concession turned out to be necessary to avoid the tedious “he or she”. Using the plural or the
singular “they” (which are now recommended by most styleguides to circumvent the he/she) would have
made many statements ambiguous.
8As show in Section 5 this is in line with the empirical evidence.
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With probability λ Sam’s love is strong (θS = θH) and the probability that the match
will last is high. With probability 1−λ Sam’s love is weak (θS = θL) and the probability
of a long lasting match is low. This parameter affects the partners’ expected utility if
they remain together.
Sam chooses an action aS ∈ {0, c,m}. Specifically, if aS = m, Sam proposes mar-
riage; if aS = c, he proposes cohabitation without formal marriage, which confirms the
status quo if they are already living together. Finally, when aS = 0, Sam breaks the
relationship. In this case the game ends and both partners receive their reservation util-
ities US and UR, where US ,UR > 0 represent possible future matches. Denoting MR
the extent to which Robin enjoys living with Sam, we make the following assumptions
throughout the paper.
Assumption 1: E [θS ]MR = [λθH + (1− λ)θL]MR < UR,
Assumption 2: θLMR < UR < θHMR,
Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that Robin’s incomplete information about Sam’s feelings
is relevant for the outcome. In other words, Assumption 1 implies that absent any in-
formation acquisition, Robin’s expected value of θSMR is smaller than her reservation
utility. Consequently, Robin prefers to look for a new partner when the initial uncer-
tainty about the quality of the matching persists. Assumption 2, on the other hand,
implies that Robin wants to accept Sam’s proposal if she knows for sure that Sam’s
feelings are strong (θS = θH), while she would refuse the proposal if she knew that the
quality of the match is low (θS = θL).
9
Sam’s action implies a cost ϕS(aS). We assume that ϕS(0) = ϕS(c) = 0, while a
marriage proposal, if accepted, implies the expected cost ϕS(m) = (1− θS)D, where
(1− θS) is the probability of divorce and D its cost. The expected cost of the marriage
proposal is lower when the quality of the matching is high: ϕH(m) < ϕL(m). Note that
when a marriage proposal is accepted, a binding contract is concluded: after marriage,
9As a referee observed, our results remain valid when divorce implies some alimony for Robin,
provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 continue to hold. Specifically, Robin’s utility in case of marriage
would be UR = θSMR + (1− θS)A, where A denotes alimony. Assumptions 1 and 2 become E[θS ]MR +
(1−E[θS ])A < UR and θLMR + (1− θL)A < UR < θHMR + (1− θH)A, respectively.
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the union can only be dissolved by paying the cost of divorce. With cohabitation instead
the relationship can be broken without any cost.10 For simplicity we assume that the
proposal in itself is not costly. However, our formal model would not change if proposing
would involve a cost, say a diamond ring. What matters then would be the total cost
of an accepted proposal. In equilibrium Sam would never buy a diamond ring if the
proposal would be refused.
After observing Sam’s action, Robin chooses aR ∈ {y, n}. Robin can either accept
Sam’s proposal (aR = y) or break the relationship (aR = n).
The two partners’ utilities are given by
UR = (1− I)UR + IθSMR, (1)
US = (1− I)US + I [θSMS − ϕS(aS)] ,
where I is an indicator function which takes the value I = 1 if aS ∈ {c,m} along with
aR = y (Sam and Robin stay together) and the value I = 0 otherwise (either Sam or
Robin breaks the relationship). When Robin and Sam remain together, Sam’s expected
utility from the matching quality is θSMS , where MS measures the extent to which Sam
enjoys living with Robin. Our main results are obtained for the case where absent of
divorce costs Sam prefers to remain with Robin, no matter of his type.
Assumption 3: θHMS > θLMS ≥ US
Recall that from Assumptions 1 and 2 Robin always prefers to look for a new partner
when the matching quality is low, or when she is uncertain about the matching quality,
that is UR > E [θS ]MR > θLMR.
This is the most interesting case because it implies that Sam’s and Robin’s prefer-
ences are not perfectly aligned (see the end of Section 2.2 for the case in which they are
instead fully aligned). This creates some incentives to lie. Specifically, when the match-
ing quality is low Sam has an incentive to try to persuade Robin that the matching is
10The perception of the barriers to breaking up when married is widespread (see Seltzer, 2000).
“Cohabitation has emerged as a way for two people to live together without marriage and to avoid the
potentially higher costs of divorce if the union does not last” (Perelli-Harris et al. 2017, page 303). See
also Lundberg et al. (2016).
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Figure 1: Game tree.
high in order to stay together. As a consequence, a simple communication like “Our love
will be forever” would represent mere cheap talk and would not be credible. Conversely,
when the matching quality is high Sam may want to invest in a costly proposal to make
the transmission of information about the matching quality credible.
The timing of actions is the following. First, Nature draws the type of the matching
quality, θS ∈ {θL, θH}, which is observable to Sam but not to Robin. Robin only knows
the distribution of types. Then, Sam chooses aS ∈ {0, c,m}. After observing Sam’s
action, Robin chooses aR ∈ {y, n}. Figure 1 represents the extensive form of the game.
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Given that Sam knows θS , Sam’s action potentially transmits some information to
Robin about the matching quality. When observing Sam’s action, Robin updates her
beliefs using Bayes’ rule. Let λ˜ (aS) denote Robin’s posterior belief that the matching
quality is high. Robin’s utility when staying with Sam can then be rewritten as
UR = E[θS |aS ]MR = [λ˜(aS)θH + (1− λ˜(aS))θL]MR.
Robin will choose to remain with Sam (aR = y) if and only if her posterior belief λ˜(aS)
is sufficiently large. Conversely, given UR > E [θS ]MR > θLMR, Robin will break the
relationship when learning that the matching is low, or when there is no information
transmission.
When discussing the outcome of the game we shall often refer to the concept of
“efficient” match. A match is efficient if θSMS ≥ US and θSMR ≥ UR so that the
relationship generates some surplus for both partners. Given Assumptions 1–3 this
translates into:
Definition 1 A match is efficient if E[θS |aS ]MR ≥ UR and θLMS ≥ US ; both partners
receive a utility larger than their reservation level.
In a world of full information all efficient matches, and only these, would continue.
Under the asymmetric information structure considered here, efficient matches may not
be durable unless Sam can somehow signal his type in a credible way.
We will focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in pure strategies; see footnote 11.
2.2 Marriage or cohabitation?
Let us determine under which conditions a separating equilibrium exists, where couples
whose match is efficient, because θHMR > UR and θHMS > US, remain together.
In such an equilibrium, Sam signals to be strongly in love (θS = θH) by choosing the
marriage proposal (aS = m) and Robin, by observing the marriage proposal, infers that
θS = θH and accepts the proposal (aR = y). Conversely, when the matching quality
is low (θS = θL), Sam optimally asks for cohabitation (aS = c), Robin infers that the
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matching quality is low and breaks the relationship (aR = n) . Posterior beliefs are then
λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0.
This separating equilibrium exists if the two partners’ incentive compatibility con-
straints are satisfied. In particular, when θS = θH , Sam must prefer to pay the cost
of the marriage proposal and to be perceived as a good matching partner instead of
proposing cohabitation, and to be perceived as a bad matching partner, in which case
Robin would break the relationship. This requires
θHMS − (1− θH)D ≥ US . (ICH)
When instead θS = θL, Sam must prefer asking to live together, being perceived as a
bad match and remaining without a partner instead of asking for marriage and being
perceived as a good matching partner, that is
US ≥ θLMS − (1− θL)D. (ICL)
From (ICH) and (ICL) a separating equilibrium in which the players’ best replies are
given by [(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y) ; (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] exists if the following
condition holds
θLMS − (1− θL)D ≤ US ≤ θHMS − (1− θH)D. (2)
The interval [θLMS − (1− θL)D; θHMS − (1− θH)D] is not empty and the separating
equilibrium we are studying is feasible.
Our assumptions then imply that Robin’s choices are optimal for her updated beliefs,
λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0, and given Sam’s strategies. Specifically, when aS = c,
Robin’s optimal choice is to break the relationship because, UR = [λ˜ (c) θH+ (1 −
λ˜ (c))θL]MR = θLMR < UR; see Assumption 2. When instead aS = m, Robin accepts
the proposal if UR = [λ˜ (m) θH+ (1− λ˜ (m))θL]MR = θHMR > UR, which follows again
from Assumption 2. Out-of-equilibrium beliefs that sustain this separating equilibrium
are, for instance, given by λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m.
What happens when (2) is not satisfied? Suppose first that US < θLMS − (1 −
θL)D so that (ICL) is violated. In this case it would be optimal for Sam to propose
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marriage irrespective of his type. But Sam’s action then transmits no information and
Robin would break the relationship because she cannot be sure about Sam’s feelings
(E[θS ]MR < UR). Hence, Sam does not make a costly marriage proposal in the first
place but suggests cohabitation aS = c ∀θS , which is refused by Robin.
Finally, suppose that (ICH) is not satisfied because θHMS−(1−θH)D < US . Then,
Sam’s optimal strategy is aS = c, ∀θS . Once again, Sam’s action does not provide any
information about his type and Robin prefers to break the relationship. To sum up,
when the incentive constraint of either of Sam’s types is violated there is a pooling
equilibrium described by [aS(θH) = aS(θL) = c; aR(c) = n]. The following proposition
summarizes results obtained so far.
Proposition 1 (Signaling without bonus/penalty) Under Assumptions 1–3:
(i) Separating equilibrium with marriage. If (2) is satisfied, then the separating
equilibrium [(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] exists with
posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs
as λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m). In words: Sam proposes marriage when the matching
quality is high and cohabitation when it is low. Robin infers Sam’s type from his
action and thus accepts the marriage proposal while refusing cohabitation.
(ii) Pooling equilibrium with breaking. If (2) does not hold, then only a pooling
equilibrium of the type [aS(θH) = aS(θL) = c; aR(c) = n] exists, where poste-
rior beliefs are λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are λ˜ (aS) = 0
∀aS 6= c). In words: Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of his type. No in-
formation transmission occurs and Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple
always breaks.
When (2) is satisfied, signaling allows information disclosure so that partners whose
utility from living together is high are able to benefit from their good prospects. Po-
tential partners with a low matching quality optimally opt for the outside-option and
their relationship breaks. In this case, the signaling mechanism is beneficial from a
welfare perspective because it allows the potential partners to overcome the problem
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of asymmetric information so that marriages between partners whose match is efficient
are made possible. However, the information transmission comes at an (expected) cost,
which the type-θH Sam has to pay to signal the good matching quality and separate
from the low-quality match. From a welfare perspective this costly signal represents a
loss and cohabitation would be preferable in case the matching ends since breaking the
relationship is costless in that case. Still, the signaling and the associated information
transmission brings about a welfare gain.11 In the next section we show how a marriage
subsidy affects this (virtuous) signaling mechanism.
Note that a separating equilibrium with cohabitation would exist if Sam’s and
Robin’s preferences were fully aligned, implying that Sam does not need to pay any
signaling cost in order to credibly transmit information. To illustrate this, consider the
case where θHMS > US ≥ θLMS , meaning that Assumption 3 is violated so that both
Sam and Robin would like to stay together only if Sam is strongly in love. A separating
equilibrium with cohabitation emerges such that [(aS (θH) = c, aR (c) = y); (aS (θL) =
0, aR (0) = n)] and with posterior beliefs λ˜ (c) = 1 (and out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜ (aS)
= 0 ∀aS 6= c). In words, Sam asks Robin to go on living together when the matching
quality is high and breaks the relationship when the matching quality is low. Robin
infers Sam’s type from his action and thus accepts cohabitation when asked for. In this
case marriage never occurs in equilibrium.
The strategy we adopt for presenting our results is as follows. Proposition 1 has
explained the signaling mechanism with neither bonus nor penalty, that is when B = 0.
In Section 3 we show how equilibria in the region of the parameters where signaling is
possible when B = 0 change when B becomes positive (Proposition 2). Then, in Section
4, we examine the same question when B becomes negative (Proposition 4). In addition,
11In Proposition 1 we focus on separating and pooling equilibria. A natural hybrid or semi-pooling
equilibrium in our setting would be the following: the high-type Sam always chooses the marriage
proposal whereas the low-type Sam randomizes between a marriage proposal and cohabitation. By ob-
serving a marriage proposal Robin updates her beliefs according to Bayes’ rule and accepts the proposal
if the updated probability that the proposal comes from a high-type Sam is sufficiently high. Robin
always refuses cohabitation because she correctly infers that it comes from a low-type. This equilibrium
is less efficient than a separating one because also some low-quality matches realize. Considering mixed
strategies would multiply the number of cases and equilibria to be considered without changing our
main message.
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Proposition 3 and 5 show that the bonus and the penalty can lead to the existence of a
signaling equilibrium which otherwise would not be possible. We treat the bonus and
the penalty separately because the counter-intuitive results and the parameter regions
where they occur are different according to the sign of B.
3 Marriage or cohabitation under a marriage bonus
Suppose now that the tax regime of couples translates into a bonus B > 0 for married
couples. Assume that B is equally shared between the two partners so that utilities in
case of marriage become:
US = θS (MS +B/2)− ϕS(m)
UR = [λ˜ (m) θH + (1− λ˜ (m))θL] (MR +B/2) ,
Hence B reduces the expected cost of the marriage proposal to ϕBS (m) = (1 − θS)D −
θSB/2.
Sam’s incentive constraints are now given by
θH (MS +B/2)− (1− θH)D ≥ US , (ICBH)
and
US ≥ θL (MS +B/2)− (1− θL)D. (ICBL )
Hence, a marriage bonus relaxes (ICBH) but reinforces (IC
B
L ). This does not come as
a surprise. The bonus will make a proposal more attractive for the high-type Sam;
this is a “good thing” and makes the existence of a separating equilibrium more likely.
However, the bonus will also make a proposal more attractive for the low-type Sam
which is a “bad thing” from this perspective.
The condition for separation on Sam’s side is now
θL (MS +B/2)− (1− θL)D ≤ US ≤ θH (MS +B/2)− (1− θH)D. (3)
This expression shows that the introduction of a marriage bonus shifts the interval of
US values for which Sam can credibly signal his matching quality to the right while also
increasing its length; see Figure 2.
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In addition, the introduction of the bonus B may affect Robin’s best reply. Specifi-
cally, when no information is transmitted, or when she knows for sure that Sam’s type
is θL, she will continue to refuse marriage or cohabitation only as long as
E [θS ] (MR +B/2) = [λθH + (1− λ)θL] (MR +B/2) < UR, (4)
θL (MR +B/2) < UR < θH (MR +B/2) . (5)
When B = 0 these conditions are satisfied from Assumption 1 and 2 but they may be
violated when B is sufficiently large. Observe that (4) implies θL (MR +B/2) < UR and
that UR < θH (MR +B/2) follows from Assumption 2 as long as B > 0. Consequently,
Condition (4) implies Condition (5), but the opposite is not true. In words, (5) requires
that Robin continues to refuse Sam’s proposal to live together if she knew that his
feelings are weak, which is a requirement for the separating equilibrium.
Comparing (2) and (3) and using (4)–(5) establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Signaling when moving from B = 0 to B > 0) Under Assumptions
1–3, suppose that condition (3) holds for B = 0:
(i) Signaling continues to be possible. If θLB/2 ≤ min{US− θLMS + (1− θL)D;
UR − θLMR} conditions (3) and (5) are satisfied and the separating equilibrium
[(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)] continues to exist with
posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs
as λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m).
(ii) Signaling is no longer possible. If either condition (3) or condition (4), or both
do not hold, then signaling becomes impossible. Only pooling equilibria survive;
specifically, we have:
1. Pooling equilibrium with breaking. If (4) is met but (3) is violated, i.e.
if US − θLMS + (1− θL)D < θLB/2 ≤E[θS ]B/2 < UR−E[θS ]MR, then only
a pooling equilibrium with [aS = c ∀θS , aR (c) = n] exists, where posterior
beliefs are λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are λ˜ (aS) = 0
13
∀aS 6= c). Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of his matching quality and
Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
2. Pooling equilibrium with marriage. If (4) is violated, i.e. if E[θS ]B/2 >
UR−E[θS ]MR, then only a pooling equilibrium with [aS = m ∀θS , aR (m) = y]
exists, where posterior beliefs are λ˜ (m) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m). In words: Sam proposes marriage irrespec-
tive of his type, and Robin accepts so that all partners remain together.
The previous proposition first considers the case described in Proposition 1(i) where
a separating equilibrium exists when B = 0. Not surprisingly, when B is sufficiently
small, the equilibrium is not affected. More surprising results obtain for larger levels
of B, when the incentive constraint of the low-type Sam is violated or when Robin’s
Condition (4) is not longer satisfied (Proposition 2(ii)). Only pooling equilibria exist in
these cases; the bonus implies that no marriages at all or too many are being concluded.
This means that the marriage subsidy deeply interferes with the virtuous signaling
mechanism, where it otherwise corrects a “market failure” brought about by asymmetric
information.
In case (1) we have a pooling equilibrium which is equivalent to the one described in
point (ii) of Proposition 1. This occurs when B is sufficiently large to make a proposal
attractive to the low-type Sam but not large enough for Robin to accept the proposal,
without information transmission (so that Condition (4) holds).12 Hence, Sam does
not pay the cost of the marriage proposal and only proposes cohabitation which Robin
refuses.
Case (2) occurs when the marriage bonus implies that (4) no longer holds and a new
type of pooling equilibrium with marriage emerges. Here Robin prefers to remain with
Sam even without information disclosure because of the bonus. Sam’s optimal strategy
is now aS = m ∀θS and Robin accepts. In this pooling equilibrium all partners stay
together even when the matching quality is poor. Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2.
Observe that to assess the impact of B on welfare one has to account for the fact
12This is only possible when US − θLMS + (1− θL)D < UR−E[θS ]MR.
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Figure 2: Impact of a marriage bonus. The region of the parameters where signaling is
possible with B = 0 is depicted with a black bold boundary. When B > 0, the latter is
divided in three parts: the shaded area indicates the region where signaling continues
to exist, the light grey area is the region where “pooling with breaking” emerges, the
shaded area is where “pooling with marriage” occurs.
that the bonus must somehow be financed. To measure welfare when the level of B is
different from zero, we thus use the total surplus generated by the concluded marriages
(including that due to B) minus the total cost of financing the bonus. This is equivalent
to evaluating total surplus generated by marriages without counting theB’s in individual
utilities.
The two outcomes described in Proposition 2(ii) are inefficient according to Defi-
nition 1. Specifically, the marriage bonus prevents signaling and efficient matches are
not concluded (case 1), or inefficient matches are induced (case 2). In the second case,
the welfare loss is particularly high because both high- and low-types pay the signaling
cost but there is no information disclosure.
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Proposition 2 provides a rather negative view of the marriage bonus. That a mar-
riage bonus distorts the decision to get married is not surprising in itself; see the Kaplow
quote in the Introduction. From that perspective two main lessons emerge from our
proposition. First, unlike traditional distortions in taxation theory, the marriage dis-
tortion is not continuous in B; once the critical threshold (B/2 = US/θL −MS + (1−
θL)D/θL) is reached, we have a discrete switch involving a drastic change in regime and
a complete destruction of information transmission.13 Second, the sign of the distortion
may be at odds with intuition because the bonus may effectively lead to fewer marriages.
Recall that Proposition 2 assumes that condition (3) is satisfied when B = 0. When
this is not true, a number of mostly trivial cases can arise. One interesting result
emerges, though. Assume that (ICBH) is violated for B = 0. Then, a suitably designed
marriage bonus may have a positive impact and make signaling possible. Recall, that
the interval of US for which condition (3) holds depends on B. For any given US one can
thus find levels of B for which (3) is satisfied. If this can be done without violating (4)
and (5) then the bonus induces a separating equilibrium and thus enables information
transmission.
Proposition 3 (From no signaling to signaling with B > 0) Under Assumptions
1–3, suppose that condition (ICBH) does not hold for B = 0 so that signaling is impossible
in the laissez-faire.
If the interval [(US + (1 − θH)D − θHMS)/θH ; (UR − E [θS ]MR)/E[θS ]] is non-
empty, then a tax bonus B/2 belonging to that interval makes the separating equilibrium
[(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)], with posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) =
1 and λ˜ (c) = 0 (and out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜(aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m), possible.
Now the sign of the effect is as expected (a bonus produces more marriages), and the
marriage bonus impacts on the marriage decision in such a way that welfare increases.
Specifically, by making signaling possible it induces efficient matches.
13Some smoothness may, however, be reestablished at an aggregate level when potential couples are
heterogenous and the parameters, and particularly US , are suitably distributed.
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4 Marriage or cohabitation under a marriage penalty
The previous section has considered the introduction of a marriage bonus and has shown
that it may produce some unexpected results. In particular, it may prevent some mar-
riages from being concluded. We now examine the case where the income taxation
implies a marriage penalty so that B < 0. As announced before, we study the two
cases separately because it turns out that they are not exactly symmetrical. A marriage
penalty will reinforce the incentive constraint of the high-type Sam but relax that of
the low type. It won’t affect the decision of Robin if she is uninformed, or believes for
sure that the matching is of low quality; in either case she will continue to refuse the
proposal. However, the penalty may also make a proposal unattractive which she firmly
believes emanates from a Sam who is strongly in love, as Proposition 4(ii) shows.
Once again we start with a situation where condition (3) holds for B = 0 so that
there is a separating equilibrium with marriage. This yields the following counterpart
to Proposition 2.
Proposition 4 (Signaling when moving from B = 0 to B < 0) Under Assumptions
1–3, suppose that (3) holds for B = 0.
(i) Signaling continues to be possible. If θLB/2 ≥ US −θHMS + (1 − θH)D
(so that (3) is still satisfied because ICBH holds despite the penalty) and if UR <
θH (MR +B/2) (so that Robin accepts a marriage proposal from a high-type Sam
despite the penalty) the separating equilibrium [(aS (θH) = m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL)
= c, aR (c) = n)] continues to exist with posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c) = 0
(and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs as λ˜ (aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m).
(ii) Pooling equilibrium with breaking. If θLB/2 < max{US −θLMS + (1 −
θL)D;UR − θHMR} so that either (3) or the second inequality in (5) is violated,
signaling becomes impossible and only the pooling equilibrium [aS = c ∀θS , aR (c) =
n] exists where posterior beliefs are λ˜ (c) = λ (and possible out-of-equilibrium
beliefs are λ˜ = 0 ∀aS 6= c). Sam proposes cohabitation irrespective of the matching
quality and Robin refuses cohabitation so that the couple always breaks.
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Figure 3: The impact of a marriage penalty. The region of the parameters where
signaling is possible with B = 0 is depicted with a black bold boundary. When B < 0,
the latter is divided in two parts: the shaded area indicates the region where signaling
continues to exist whereas the light grey area is the region where “pooling with breaking”
emerges.
While Proposition 2 described the surprising property that a marriage bonus may
actually prevent some marriages from being concluded, Proposition 4 states the intuitive
result that a penalty may reduce the number of marriages. Note that Proposition 2
and Proposition 4 are not fully symmetric because a pooling equilibrium with marriage
does not emerge when B decreases from zero. Figure 3 illustrates Proposition 4
However, a penalty can also produce less expected results if we consider a different
reference point. This is illustrated by the following proposition which is the counterpart
to Proposition 3.
Note the asymmetry between bonus and penalty. When B > 0, more marriages are
possible if we start from the situation where condition (ICBH), the incentive constraint
of the high type Sam does not hold for B = 0. When B < 0, on the other hand, more
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marriages are possible if we start from the situation where condition (ICBL ), that is the
incentive constraint of the low type Sam is violated for B = 0.
Proposition 5 (From no signaling to signaling with B < 0) Under Assumptions
1–3, suppose that condition (ICBL ) does not hold for B = 0 so that signaling is impossible
in the laissez-faire.
If the interval [(UR− θHMR)/θH ; (US − θLMS + (1− θL)D)/θL] is non-empty, then
a tax bonus B/2 belonging to that interval makes the separating equilibrium [(aS (θH) =
m, aR (m) = y); (aS (θL) = c, aR (c) = n)], with posterior beliefs λ˜ (m) = 1 and λ˜ (c)
= 0 (and out-of-equilibrium beliefs λ˜(aS) = 0 ∀aS 6= m), possible.
When the incentive constraint of the low-type Sam (ICBL ) is not satisfied, both
types want to propose and signaling is impossible. Now, a marriage penalty may lead
to an outcome where a proposal is no longer attractive for a low-type Sam (when
θLB/2 < US − θLMS + (1 − θL)D), while remaining the best strategy for a high-type
Sam, and where Robin continues to accept a proposal from a high-type Sam despite the
penalty (θHB/2 > UR − θHMR). In this situation, the penalty leads to a separating
equilibrium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which was otherwise
not possible.
5 Possible extensions
In this section, we show that the key property of the game holds in richer set-ups as
well. In particular, we show that information disclosure during cohabitation, separation
costs when a cohabiting couples splits, and labor supply effects do not impact our main
result: a marriage penalty can increase the probability of marriage due to efficiency
enhancing information transmission. Finally, in the last subsection, we suggest how our
results might contribute to the empirical debate about the effects of marriage penalties
and bonuses on the decision to get married.
Cohabitation discloses information on the quality of the match Recall that
we do not rule out that the partners are already cohabiting and that some information
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has already been revealed. But this admittedly does not account for the possibility that
partners strategically choose cohabitation to obtain more information.
To introduce this issue one can extend the model assuming that Sam has the choice
between proposing marriage immediately or after one period of cohabitation, which
discloses some information on the quality of the match. Specifically, if Robin accepts
this period of cohabitation, she receives an exogenous signal about the quality of the
match and updates her beliefs. Sam observes the signal too and can then propose to
Robin to go on with cohabitation, to marry or to split. Outside options may decrease
during this additional period of cohabitation.
Appendix A.1 studies this extension. We show that signaling with a marriage pro-
posal continues to be possible, provided information disclosure is limited. This is in
line with the evidence provided by Bumpass and Sweet (1989). Using the 1987–1988
National Survey of Families and Households in the U.S., they report that cohabiting
unions and marriages preceded by cohabitation are more likely to break up than are
unions initiated by marriage. Balakrishnan et al. (1987) and Seltzer (2000)’s results are
less drastic, but they also conclude that information disclosure through cohabitation is
far from effective and does not appear to enhance the stability of marriage.
We do not explicitly consider tax bonuses or penalties within this extended model.
When bonuses or penalties are introduced, the number of possible equilibria increases.
However, the main message we convey is not affected: marriage remains an efficient
signal of the quality of the match and the tax penalty/subsidy impacts its signaling
mechanism in a possibly counter-intuitive way.
Cohabitation also entails a splitting cost We have assumed that breaking up
cohabitation is costless to Sam. In reality it is likely to be costly, particularly because
cohabitation is increasingly a childrearing institutions (Seltzer 2000, Lundberg et al.
2016). If a cohabiting couple splits, Sam may be responsible for child support.
When breaking up cohabitation also involves a cost, which is lower than the cost of
divorce, one could think about D as the differential in break-up costs under marriage
and under cohabitation. With this interpretation in mind, the model shows that a
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marriage proposal is a more effective signal than a cohabitation proposal.
To see this formally, assume that cohabitation implies a breaking cost of Dc, whereas
marriage implies a breaking cost of Dm, with Dc < Dm. Signaling is possible when
θLMS − (1− θL)Dk ≤ US ≤ θHMS − (1− θH)Dk with k = c,m.
Consequently the interval of Sam’s reservation utilities where signaling is possible is
larger under marriage; the extra segment has length (θH−θL)(Dm−Dc) = (θH−θL)D.
This implies that proposing marriage can induce efficient matches more often than
proposing cohabitation. In addition, starting from B = 0, separating equilibria with
marriage continue to be possible for larger levels of the bonus/penalty.
To sum up, if proposing cohabitation entails an expected cost, then the game be-
comes richer and many new equilibria emerge (including signaling with cohabitation)
but the main message we convey is not affected: marriage remains the most efficient sig-
nal of the quality of the match and, again, the tax penalty/subsidy impacts its signaling
mechanism in a non-trivial way.
Labor supply is affected by marriage and taxation Our model is admittedly
highly stylized and preferences represent a reduced form. Consequently B is to be
understood as net bonus or penalty accounting for any induced change in labor supply.
Observe that with our quasi-linear specification, everything is expressed in terms of
monetary equivalent so that one can think of B as the utility cost or benefit.
To be more precise this can be illustrated as follows. Individuals when single solve
max
yR
VR = uR[yR − TR(yR)]− vR(yR/wR)
max
yS
VS = uS [yS − TS(yS)]− vS(ys/ws).
Where yi (i = R,S) indicates labor income, Ti(yi) the tax function and wi the wage, so
that labor supply is given by `i = yi/wi. A (unitary) couple, on the other hand solves
max
yR,yS
VC = uC [cR, cS ]− vC(yR/wR, yS/wS) +K
s.t. yR + ys − TC(yR, yS) = cR + cS .
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This is just an illustration; one can think of alternative specifications, for instance
for a collective couple. The term K includes all the match related benefits (including
complementarities utilities from consumption and leisure) as well as the expected cost
of divorce. Furthermore the functional form of TR and TS may be the same for instance
due to political constraints. Using a ∗ to denote the indirect utilities, our B is then
given by
B = (V ∗C −K)− (V ∗R + V ∗S );
so that it already accounts for changes in labor supply that may be induced by the joint
taxation of couples.
To sum up, while our reduced form approach obscures some of the underlying ad-
justments, this has no impact on our results.
Empirical evidence and implications Throughout the paper we have concentrated
on a single couple identified by given parameter values. In reality, these parameters are
likely to differ across couples. While any conjecture about their distribution would
be highly speculative, one can expect that the different cases we have considered (as
well as the “trivial” cases we have neglected) coexist in reality. Consequently, positive
and negative effects of the bonus or penalty may at least in part cancel out through
aggregation. This can explain that the empirical studies mentioned in the Introduction
typically find that the tax regime applied to married couples appears to have little
impact on the decision to get married. Some studies like Alm and Whittington (2003)
do find a statistically significant effect particularly for the transition from cohabitation
to marriage, but they concede that the effect is quite small and that other factors appear
to have a more sizeable impact. More recent studies exploiting exogenous changes in
the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) eligibility yield more mixed results (but concern
only a subset of the population).14 Michelmore (2018) finds the penalties discourage
marriage probabilities for single mothers by about 2.5 percentage points. Isaac (2018)
and Bastian (2017), on the other hand, obtain estimates that suggest a more complex
14Namely those (potential) couples where at least one of the spouses has a sufficiently small income
to qualify for the tax credit. We thank the reviewer who brought these studies to our attention.
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relationship: the effect may not go in the expected direction and depend on the specific
income levels.
Testing whether, in a given country, the effects of the tax policy cancel out in aggre-
gation is not a trivial endeavour. A possible approach would be to compare the behavior
of subgroups in the population which differ only with respect to a single characteris-
tic (such as the socioeconomic status, education, the prevailing social norm, etc.) to
examine whether, after a change in policy, they move in opposite directions.
A possible avenue is the following. Take the partners’ outside options as a source of
heterogeneity in the couple’s reaction to a marriage penalty and consider education as a
proxy for US and UR. Better-educated men and women in the US are today more likely
to live in a marital union than less-educated men and women but the association between
education and marriage was negative some decades ago (see Lundberg et al. 2016).
First, this evidence suggests that past reforms may have affected more and less-educated
US citizens in a different way. Second, considering that the US marriage penalty seems
to have modest effects overall, this evidence also suggests that a positive effect of the
penalty on marriages of the more-educated individuals may have partially compensated
a negative effect of the penalty on marriages of the less-educated individuals. In our
model, this may translate into the two following simultaneous patters: B < 0 reduces the
signaling value of a marriage proposal, and thus the number of marriages, for the less-
educated (so that Proposition 4(ii) would hold for the less-educated) whereas it might
allow the more-educated to move from a situation where signaling was not feasible to
the opposite situation (Proposition 5 would hold for the more-educated).
As a last observation, the impact of the income levels and specifically a scenario
where B < 0 reduces the number of marriages for the less-educated seems in line
with the evidence based on changes in EITC eligibility. In particular, Isaac (2018)
and Michelmore (2018) show that low-income people are affected by penalties in the
expected way.
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6 Concluding comments
Our model delivers the striking result that a marriage bonus may actually reduce the
probability that a couple gets married. If the bonus is sufficiently large, the signal
becomes uninformative. Partners whose match is efficient may split up, while others,
whose match is inefficient, might get married. Similarly, a marriage penalty may induce
marriages with high-quality matches. The penalty may lead to a separating equilib-
rium with efficiency enhancing information transmission, which would otherwise not be
possible.
Turning to policy implications, our results also mean that marriage decisions in the
laissez-faire are not necessarily privately optimal. In some cases a bonus or a penalty
may effectively make the marriage decision more efficient. However, when the signaling
mechanism is operative both bonuses or penalties—unless too small to have an impact—
will make the marriage decision less efficient.
As pointed out by Kaplow the fact that the tax system potentially “distorts” a
privately optimal marriage decision should be accounted for when studying the design of
couples’ taxation. From that perspective, our results have two important implications.
First, the “distortion” may go in an unexpected direction. Second, the violation of
what is often referred to as “marriage neutrality” may make the marriage decision more
efficient and thus does not effectively represent a “distortion” in the traditional sense
of the word.
Incorporating these features into an optimal tax model represents quite a challenge.
A possible setting could be the following. Potential partners choose between getting
married, implying a joint income tax, or not to getting married, implying individual
taxation. Using the notation from the previous section, marriage would imply the tax
rule TC(yR, yS), while singles face the tax schedules TR(yR) and TS(yS), which may be
gender neutral so that TR(y) = TS(y) = T (y). The tax system affects marriages unless
TC(yR, yS) = TR(yR) + TS(yS), that is couple taxation is individual based. Recall that
the parameter K represents the net benefit from the marriage, which is likely to be
the partners’ private information. The tax design problem is here independent of the
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partners’ choice of which type of living arrangement to enter. The latter can be studied
as an indirect mechanism, because no report on K is required. Given the tax schedule
designed by the government, we can find the indirect utilities of the partners who
truthfully report their labor productivity and we can use them to tackle the partners’
self-selection problem, which depends on K. This approach is based on Lehmann et al.
(2014) who consider two competing governments designing (individual) income taxes
for singles who may migrate. In the setting we are suggesting there would be a single
government and two options for partners, who can “migrate” from on status to the
other. This is just suggestive of a possible direction for research and at this point we
can only make conjectures about the results.
From that perspective, two practical lessons emerge. First, one might think that
ensuring marriage neutrality is an argument to move to a more individual based tax. It
would mitigate the marriage distortion, which for the rest has to be balanced against
the redistributive benefits of a non-individual tax. This argument certainly applies
when potential couples have full information so that marriage decisions are (hopefully)
privately optimal, at least from an ex ante perspective. In our incomplete information
setting it continues to go through for the couples where, for instance, the signaling
becomes uninformative because of a bonus, or where efficient marriages are crowded
out by a penalty. However, our results show that for other couples it may play in the
opposite direction. So overall, the way the optimal tax system is affected by endogenous
marriage decisions depends on the distribution of parameters in the population. To sum
up, marriage neutrality does not in itself imply that a more individual based tax system
is desirable.
Second, and looking at the marriage decision from a broader perspective, it is often
argued that (hopefully stable) marriages provide a positive externality to society and
should be encouraged.15 According to conventional wisdom this in turn would plead for
a bonus and against a penalty. However, our results suggest that this argument may
not stand under closer scrutiny because these incentives may backfire.
15Kaplow (2008) and Leturcq (2012) mention this argument, but it is more prominently discussed in
the law and economics literature; see for instance Cohen (2004).
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Appendix
A.1 Information disclosure during cohabitation
We add two more stages to the game in such a way that each of the two partners takes
at most two actions. The extensive form of this new game is represented in Figure
4. Timing is as follows. Nature draws the type of the matching quality. Then, Sam
chooses a1S ∈ {01, c1,m1}. After observing Sam’s action, Robin chooses a1R ∈ {y1, n1}.
If a1S ∈ {01,m1} the game is as before. If instead Sam proposes cohabitation, meaning
that a1S = c
1, and Robin accepts, meaning that a1R = y
1, Nature draws a partially
informative signal. The (symmetric) exogenous signal on Sam’s type is δS ∈ {δH , δL},
where δH (δL) is good (bad) news about Sam’s type. After observing the realization of
the signal, Robin updates her beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Then, Sam has a second
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opportunity to propose either marriage or the status quo and chooses a2S ∈ {02,m2, c2}.
Finally Robin chooses a2R ∈ {y2, n2}.
If the realization of the exogenous signal is δH , Robin’s updated beliefs are such that
E [θS |δH ] = λθH + (1− λ)θL + ∆;
whereas, if the realization of the exogenous signal is δL, Robin’s beliefs are such that
E [θS |δL] = λθH + (1− λ)θL −∆.
where ∆ is the increase (decrease) in the expectation of θS if the realized signal is δH
(δL).
16
The cost of a marriage proposal is the same as before but we assume that, if the new
stage of the game is reached, then the outside option decreases of the amount ω ≥ 0,
because of the depreciation of the two players’ value in the marriage market.
If signal δS ∈ {δH , δL} is not too informative and ω is sufficiently low, then Assump-
tions from 1 to 3 can be adjusted as follow.
Assumption 4: E [θS |δH ]MR = [λθH + (1− λ)θL + ∆]MR < UR − ω,
Assumption 5: θLMR < UR − ω < θHMR,
Assumption 6: US − ω ≤ θLMS < θHMS .
Assumption 4 states that, once she receives good news about the quality of the match,
Robin still prefers her outside option. Assumption 5 indicates that Robin prefers to
remain with Sam if the quality of the match is high and to break the relationship if
the quality of the match is low. Assumption 6 states that Sam prefers to remain with
Robin no matter his type.
If a1S ∈ {01,m1} the payoff functions described in (1) still hold. After the new stage
16A signal consistent with this representation is characterized by a pair of conditional probabilities
(piH , piL) where piS , with piS ∈ [1/2, 1] and S = H,L, is the probability of observing the realization of
the signal δS conditional on the type being θS : piS = prob(δS |θS). The signal is symmetric, thus we
have piH = piL = pi. Prob(θH |δH) = λpiλpi+(1−λ)(1−pi) > λ, confirming that δH is good news about Sam’s
type. The closer pi is to one and the more informative the signal δS is.
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of the game, the two partners’ utilities are instead given by
U2R = (1− I) (UR − ω) + IθSMR,
U2S = (1− I) (US − ω) + I [θSMS − ϕS(aS)] .
If Assumptions from 4 to 6 hold, then the following separating equilibrium exists.
No matter his type, Sam proposes cohabitation in the first stage and Robin accepts.
After the realization of the exogenous signal δS Sam plays again and now his strategy
depends on his type. The high-type proposes marriage while the low-type proposes
again cohabitation. Robin infers that the marriage proposal comes from a high-type and
optimally accepts the offer. In the same way she infers that the proposal to go on with
cohabitation comes from a low-type and optimally breaks the relationship. Formally,
this separating equilibrium with marriage writes: [(a1S (θS) = c
1 ∀θS , a1R
(
c1
)
= y1);
(a2S (θH) = m
2, aR
(
m2
)
= y2); (a2S (θL) = c
2, a2R
(
c2
)
= n2)], posterior beliefs are λ˜
(
m2
)
= 1 and λ˜
(
c2
)
= 0; and possible out-of-equilibrium beliefs are λ˜
(
a1S
)
= 0 ∀a1S 6= c1 and
λ˜
(
02
)
= prob(θH |δj), where δj is the realized signal.
If the opposite of Assumption 4 holds instead and, moreover,
E [θS |δL]MR = [λθH + (1− λ)θL −∆]MR < UR − ω,
then a semi-pooling equilibrium with cohabitation and no signaling costs emerges where
equilibrium strategies depend on the realization of the exogenous signal δS . In such
equilibrium, Sam proposes cohabitation when the signal is δH and splits otherwise.
Robin accepts cohabitation after observing signal δH . Note that, in this semi-pooling
equilibrium, some inefficient matches are concluded.
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Figure 4: The extended game
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